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Reputational concerns should discipline credit rating agencies (CRAs), eliminate any conflicts of 
interest, and motivate them to provide unbiased ratings. However, the recent financial crisis 
confirms models of CRAs’ behavior that predict inflated ratings for complex products and 
during booms. We test whether CRAs suffered a reputational damage for this behavior. We find 
strong support in the data for our hypothesis. The stock price reaction to rating revisions is 
significantly lower after the financial crisis, particularly in the financial sector. In multivariate 
tests, we find that the stock price reaction is lower, on average, in the post-crisis period by 2.3%. 
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report”: “We conclude 
the failures of credit rating agencies were essential 
cogs in the wheel of financial destruction. The three 
credit rating agencies were key enablers of the 
financial meltdown.” 
The Final Report of the National Commission 
on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis 
in the United States published in 2011, concluded 
that the three major credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
had a key responsibility in the development of the 
recent financial crisis. The Report blamed the credit 
rating agencies for failing to properly evaluate the 
credit risk of collateralized securities, and even 
claimed that “This crisis could not have happened 
without the rating agencies.” We ask the important 
question of whether the credit rating agencies 
suffered a reputational damage for their behavior. 
Investors rely on CRAs to reduce information 
asymmetries in financial markets (Brealey, Leland, 
and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984). Reputational 
concerns should discipline CRAs, eliminate any 
conflicts of interest, and motivate them to provide 
unbiased ratings (Schwarcz (2002). Upward biased 
ratings would in fact ex post hurt their reputation 
and lead to the loss of future business. 
However, due to different incentives, CRAs 
could, ex-ante, optimally deviate from minimizing 
information asymmetries. There could be 
equilibrium outcomes where the credit rating 
agencies optimally inflate their ratings. Mathis, 
McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) provide a theoretical 
framework where the reputation mechanism 
disciplines CRAs actions only if rating complex 
products is not a major source of income. But in the 
years leading to the financial crisis, the business of 
rating complex products boomed, and this likely 
weakened the CRAs’ reputational concerns. 
According to the predictions of the model, 
Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2013) empirically 
document that issuer-paid agencies tend to cater to 
issuers' interests and understate credit risk. CRAs 
did inflate their ratings and this, as underlined by 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, critically 
contributed to the recent financial meltdown. 
Furthermore, in the model of Bolton, Freixas, 
and Shapiro (2012) CRAs are more likely to inflate 
ratings during economic booms. This happens 
because during booms a larger clientele of investors 
(naive investors) take ratings at face value and 
because during booms there is also a lower risk of 
issuer failure that could damage the raters’ 
reputation. This results in profits from rating 
inflation that are larger than the expected 
reputation costs. However, the collapse of the 
housing market triggered an extremely high (and 
unexpected) rate of failure among issuers. 
In this paper, we empirically test whether the 
rating agencies suffered, ex-post, a reputational 
damage. To identify the effects of the reputational 
damage, we investigate the informational content of 
credit ratings by looking at the stock price reactions 
to rating announcements before and after the crisis. 
If rating agencies suffered a reputational damage, 
we should observe a weaker stock price reaction to 
rating announcements. 
Using a sample of downgrades and upgrades 
relative to the biggest fifty stocks of the American, 
European, and Asian markets over the period 2003-
2013, we find results that provide strong support 
for our hypothesis. We find that the stock price 
reaction is significantly lower after the financial 
crisis. The effect is both statistically and 
economically significant. In multivariate tests, we 
find that the stock price reaction in the post-crisis 
period is, on average, lower by 2.3%. These results 
provide evidence consistent with a significant 
reputational damage suffered by the rating agencies. 
Rating agencies had weaker incentives to protect 
their reputational capital in the wake of the financial 
crisis due to the increasing importance of rating 
complex products. This led to inflated ratings and 
to a reputational damage following the financial 
meltdown. 
The second hypothesis we test is that the 
CRAs’ reputational damage has been particularly 
severe in the financial sector where the rating 
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agencies made the biggest mistakes. Our results 
strongly support this hypothesis. In univariate 
results and in multivariate tests, the reduction of 
the stock price reaction is always stronger in the 
subsample of financial institutions. 
Our results are important to better understand 
the incentives of CRAs and to complement the 
reputational mechanism with more regulatory 
oversight. Rating agencies play a fundamental role 
in the financial market. However, the reputational 
concerns could not be enough to discipline their 
actions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This paper relates to two main strands of the 
literature. On the one hand, it is related to the 
literature about CRAs’ reputation as a disciplining 
mechanism as in Schwarcz (2002). It is motivated by 
the theoretical models of Bolton, Freixas, and 
Shapiro (2012), Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet 
(2009), and Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) that predict 
inflated ratings during booms. The role of 
reputation is critical for financial intermediaries. 
Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011) claim that the 
poor performance of borrowers damages the lead 
arranger’s reputation. In the context of rating 
agencies, we show that the poor performance of the 
rated collateralized securities, led to a severe 
reputational damage. 
On the other hand, it contributes to the 
literature on the information content of credit 
ratings. Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) claim that the 
information content of downgrades and upgrades is 
greater in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure 
period. Xia (2014) documents a deterioration in the 
incumbents’ ratings quality following the entry of a 
third investor-paid credit rating agency. Grothe 
(2013) claim that downgrades have, on average, a 
greater impact than upgrades have. Afonso, Furceri, 
and Gomes (2012) show a significant response of 
government bond yield spreads to rating changes, 






3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
To assess the impact of the reputational shock on 
the information content of ratings, we analyze the 
stock market reaction to rating revisions before, 
during, and after the financial crisis. We define the 
start of the financial crisis with the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers (September, 15th, 2008). The post-
crisis period starts from October 16th, 2009 when 
the CBOE volatility index (VIX) came back to the pre-
crisis mean level. The sample consists of 1,153 
rating revisions from November 1st 2003 to 
November 1st 2013. 
We consider the rating revisions of the three 
major rating agencies, i.e. Standard & Poor’s (S&P), 
Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch Inc. The rating 
revisions are related to the 150 most representative 
companies traded on the American, European, and 
Asian/Pacific markets. In particular, we look at the 
components of the STOXX USA 50, EURO STOXX 50, 
and STOXX Asia/Pacific 50. 
Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) perform a 
numerical transformation of the alphanumerical 
rating codes. Following a similar procedure, we 
standardize the conventional alpha-numerical scale 
that goes from excellent to poor: AAA (or similar) is 
equal to 17, while CCC+ (or similar) is equal to 1. 
The positive and negative watches are equal to -0.25 
and + 0.25 respectively. 
To perform multivariate tests, we need to 
control for variables that previous research claimed 
to be related to the level of abnormal stock market 
reactions. We proxy the issuer’s stock risk using the 
standard deviation of the daily stock returns 
(DEVST) calculated over the 50 days leading to the 
rating action. We use the level of the VIX index to 
proxy for expected risk in the market (Bollerslev, 
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)). We obtain the rating 
revisions and other market data from the Bloomberg 
database. 
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. 
All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. It 
is interesting to note that 22% of the rating actions 
are anticipated by a previous watch (Steiner and 
Heinke (2001)). In robustness, we control for this 
effect. On average, the starting rating is equal to 
12.10 (equivalent to the A rating). Finally, the 
absolute size of the rating change is slightly bigger 
for downgrades (0.74 versus 0.67). 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Median P25 P75 
DEVST (%) 1.87 1.55 1.13 2.17 
VIX 18.58 17.57 10.34 25.26 
DUMMY_ANTICIP 0.22 0 0 0 
LAST_RATING 12.10 12 10.75 14 
CHANGE_NOTCH (+) 0.67 0.75 0.25 1 
CHANGE_NOTCH (-) -0.74 -0.75 -1 -0.25 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of rating revisions over the period 2003-2013. The 
table reports the mean, the median, the 25th and the 75th percentile of the control variables used in the multivariate 
analysis. DEVST is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns calculated over the 50 days leading to the rating 
action. VIX is the value of the VIX index on the announcement day of the rating revision. DUMMY_ANTICIP is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the rating action is the realization of the previous forecasted watch. 
LAST_RATING is the value of the rating before the rating action. CHANGE_NOTCH (+) and CHANGE_NOTCH (-) is the 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The objective of this study is to test whether the 
major CRAs suffered a reputational damage after 
the subprime crisis. Ratings are signals sent by the 
CRAs to the market. The magnitude of these signals 
is observable and is given by the value of the 
ratings. However, the precision and accuracy of 
these signals cannot be observed directly. The CRAs’ 
reputation is critical for these signals to be credible. 
A CRAs’ better reputation reinforces the market’s 
beliefs of the precision and accuracy of the CRAs’ 
ratings. 
To test whether the CRAs suffered a 
reputational damage, we empirically estimate the 
information content of rating revisions before and 
after the financial crisis. Rating changes are signals 
of new information about the issuers quality. If 
CRAs suffered a reputational damage, we should see 
lower stock price reactions for rating changes after 
the financial crisis. To capture the effect of the 
reputational channel on the market’s beliefs about 
the precision of the signals, in univariate and 
multivariate tests, we employ a standard event 
study methodology, and we compare the stock price 
reaction to rating changes before and after the 
financial crisis. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
are calculated over a three-day window centered on 
the announcement date. We consider the absolute 
values of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CARs 
(Grothe (2013). This allows to isolate the beliefs of 
the precision of the signals independently from the 
information that is already incorporated in the 
prices before the rating actions. 
 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
 
Table 2 reports the mean absolute value of the CARs 
around the rating actions for investment grade 
firms. Panel A reports CARs before and after the 
crisis. Panel B repeats the same analysis excluding 
the crisis period. 
The univariate evidence supports our 
hypothesis. Even without controlling for other 
factors, after the crisis the market reaction is 
statistically and economically significantly lower. 
Panel A shows that the average difference is equal to 
1.2% that, compared to the average value of the 
stock price reaction before the end of the crisis of 
3.5%, represents a decrease of 34%. 
In line with previous research (Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986)) the stock price reaction is bigger 
for downgrades compared to upgrades (4.1% vs. 
2.2%). This confirms that the information content of 
downgrades is higher compared to upgrades. 
Consistent with the reputational damage hypothesis, 
it is exactly for downgrades that the reduction is 
bigger. The decrease is equal to 1.7%, a reduction of 
41% compared to the mean value of 4.1% before the 
end of the subprime crisis. 
Panel B shows qualitatively similar results excluding 
the crisis period. The overall difference before and 
after the crisis is equal to 0.7%, that compared to the 
average value pre-crisis of 2.9% represents a 
decrease of 24%. The decrease for downgrades only 
is equal to 1.2%, a reduction of 33% compared to the 
pre-crisis mean value of 3.6%. 
 
 
Table 2. Univariate results 
 
 
 Downgrades  Upgrades  
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Entire sample 
Pre-Crisis + 
Crisis 
0.035 0.041 0.022 
 N=551 N=362 N=157 
Post-Crisis 0.022 0.024 0.019 
 N=261 N=130 N=107 
Difference 
(Post - Pre) 
-0.012*** -0.017*** -0.003 
Panel B. Entire sample 
Pre-Crisis 0.029 0.036 0.018 
 N=485 N=305 N=152 
Post-Crisis 0.022 0.024 0.019 
 N=261 N=130 N=107 
Difference -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.001 
(Post - Pre)    
Panel C. Subsample financials 
Pre-Crisis 0.035 0.045 0.017 
 N=204 N=127 N=72 
Post-Crisis 0.020 0.022 0.016 
 N=81 N=45 N=31 
Difference 
(Post Pre) 
-0.015*** -0.023*** -0.001 
Panel D. Subsample financials 
Pre-Crisis + 
Crisis 
0.045 0.054 0.025 
 N=252 N=170 N=76 
Post-Crisis 0.020 0.022 0.017 
 N=81 N=45 N=31 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
-0.025*** -0.032*** -0.007 
Note: Panel A reports the means of ABS_CAR for 
rating revisions of investment grade firms (no border) 
before and after the financial crisis. Column (1) 
considers the entire sample. Column (2) only 
downgrades, Column (3) only upgrades. The number of 
observations are reported under the mean values. The 
last row reports the difference of the mean value post- 
and the mean value pre-crisis. Panel B includes the crisis 
together with the pre-crisis period. ***,**,* indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Finally, Panel C and Panel D repeats the same 
analysis of Panel A and B, respectively, on the 
subsample of financial institutions. The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the CRAs 
suffered a bigger reputational damage in the 
financial sector. Both pooling downgrades and 
upgrades together and looking at downgrades alone, 
the stock price reaction is negative and always 
bigger (in absolute terms) compared to the entire 
sample. 
These preliminary results suggest that the 
CRAs’ reputational damage had a significant impact 
on how the market interprets the signals sent by 
CRAs. However, there could be determinants of the 
CARs correlated with the timing of the crisis that 
could drive the results. In the following section we 
examine the impact of the reputational damage in a 
multivariate framework. 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis and robustness 
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the reputational 
damage, we need to control for variables that 
previous studies have identified as determinants of 
the CARs. We estimate the following model for the 
entire sample, separately for downgrades and 
upgrades, and for the subsample of financial 
institutions to test our hypotheses: 
 
 































where, for the rating change ABS_CAR
i,t 
is the 
absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return 
around the rating change of firm i at time t; 
POST_CRISIS
i,t  
is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the rating change of firm i at time t happens after 
the financial crisis, and zero otherwise; 
NO_BORDER
i,t
 is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the rating change of firm i at time t concerns a 
company whose last or current ratings are 
investment-grade; VIX
t
 is the CBOE volatility index at 
time t; DEVST
i
 is the standard deviation of the 
issuer’s daily stock returns calculated over the 50 
days leading to the rating action of firm i at time t. 
To control for unobservable characteristics specific 
to the American, European, and Asian/Pacific 
regions we include region fixed effects (δ_i). 
The reputation hypothesis predicts a negative 
coefficient on the variable POST_CRISIS, which 
suggests that after the financial crisis the 
information content of the rating changes is lower. 
When the variable NO_BORDER and the interaction 
term NO_BORDER x POST_CRISIS are included, our 





. This sum represents the 
differential mean value of the absolute CAR before 
and after the financial crisis for investment-grade 
companies. 
Table 3 reports the results. Panel A considers 
the entire sample. The coefficient on the variable 
POST_CRISIS is negative and both statistically and 
economically significant. After the financial crisis 
the mean absolute value of the CAR is 2.3% lower 
(Model (1). Controlling for stock-specific risk and 
market-expected risk (Model (2), the mean absolute 
value of the CAR is 2.4% lower. Model (3) allows to 
isolate the effect on investment-grade companies 
looking at the sum of the coefficient on 
POST_CRISIS and the interaction term NO_BORDER x 
POST_CRISIS. The estimated value (-2.3%) does not 
change the previous results. 
Panel B considers the downgrades and the 
upgrades separately. Consistent with univariate 
results, the reduction of the information content of 
rating changes is greater for downgrades compared 
to upgrades. This further supports the reputation 
hypothesis. It is exactly where the CRAs’ reputation 
is more valuable, i.e. for downgrades as documented 
by previous research (Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986)), that the market’s beliefs about the precision 
of the CRAs’ signals have been significantly revised 




Table 3. Main Results 
 
 
Dep. Variable: ABS_CAR 
Dep. Variable: ABS_CAR 
Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Entire sample Panel B: Downgrades and Upgrades 
Intercept 0.0534*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.063*** 0.021*** 0.057*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
POST_CRISIS -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.012** -0.035*** -0.011*** -0.007 -0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) 
NO_BORDER   0.002   0.002 -0.001 
   (0.002)   (0.004) (0.003) 
NO_BORDERx   -0.011*   -0.030** -0.001 
POST_CRISIS   (0.006)   (0.013) (0.005) 
VIX  0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DEVST  0.446*** 0.526*** 0.560*** 0.399*** 0.456)** 0.395 
  (0.172) (0.168) (0.210) (0.255) (0.210) (0.259) 









587 414 587 414 
R2 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.18 
Note: This table reports the results of following OLS model (1). The dependent variable is the absolute value of issuers’ 
CAR around the rating revision. POST_CRISIS is a dummy variable that is equal to one after October 15th, 2009 and zero 
otherwise. The Region Fixed Effects refer to the American, European, and Asia/Pacific regions. Panel A considers the entire 
sample. Panel B analyses the downgrades and the upgrades separately. For each model the robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis under the coefficients. The final rows of each column report the number of observations and R2. 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 4 reports the results on the subsample of 
financial institutions. The main takeaway of the 
table is that the reduction of the information 
content of rating changes is bigger for the financial 
institutions. After the financial crisis the mean 
absolute value of the CAR is 3.3% lower (Model (1). 
The reduction for downgrades (4.5%) is also bigger if 
compared to the entire sample. This, together with 
the univariate results, supports the hypothesis that 
the reputational damage has been more severe for 
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Table 4. Subsample of financial institutions 
 
 
Dep. Variable: ABS CAR 
(1) Downgrades (2) Upgrades (3) 
Intercept 0.053*** 0.073*** -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) 
POST_CRISIS -0.051*** -0.066*** 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
NO_BORDER -0.011 -0.014 0.021 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
NO_BORDERx 0.018* -0.021 -0.013 
POST_CRISIS (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) 
VIX 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.005**** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DEVST 0.512* 0.778*** -0.404 
 (0.220) (0.272) (0.481) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 347 223 115 
R2 0.29 0.22 0.58 
Note: This table reports the results of the subsample of the financial institutions. Model (1) considers both 
downgrades and upgrades. Models (2) and (3) analyse the downgrades and the upgrades separately. For each model 
the robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis under the coefficients. The final rows of each column report 
the number of observations and R2. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 5 reports some robustness tests. 
Model (1) explicitly controls for the rating actions 
that are simply the realization of previous watches. 
We include a dummy variable (DUMMY_ANTICIP) 
that is equal to one if the rating action is the 
realization of the forecasted watch. Finally, we also 
control for the size of the rating change (Model (2). 
The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Table 5. Robustness 
 
 
Dep. Variable: ABS_CAR 
(1) (2) 
Intercept 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
POST_CRISIS -0.015** -0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
NO_BORDER 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
NO_BORDERx -0.012** -0.013** 
POST_CRISIS (0.006) (0.006) 
VIX 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
DEVST 0.464** 0.422** 
 (0.164) (0.164) 
DUMMY_ANTICIP -0.003  
 (0.003)  
CHANGE_NOTCH  -0.040*** 
  (0.001) 
Region FE Yes Yes 
N 1,004 1,004 
R2 0.16 0.18 
Note: This table reports the results of robustness 
tests. Model (1) includes a dummy variable 
(DUMMY_ANTICIP) that is equal to one if the rating 
action is the realization of the forecasted watch. Models 
(2) controls for the size of the rating change 
(CHANGE_NOTCH). For each model the robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis under the coefficients. 
The final rows of each column report the number of 
observations and R2. ***,**,* indicate statistical 




We investigate whether the credit rating agencies are 
still credible after the financial crisis. In particular, 
we investigate whether the rating agencies suffered 
a reputational damage after the crisis. Our results 
strongly support the hypothesis that they suffered a 
reputational damage. The empirical evidence also 
supports the hypothesis that the damage has been 
particularly severe for financial institutions, where 
they made the biggest mistakes. 
Our results are important to better understand 
the behavior of CRAs. Rating agencies play a 
fundamental role in the financial market. However, 
the reputational concerns could not be enough to 
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